This paper seeks to explain the continuing lack of economic convergence and the persistence of market dysfunctionality, or wild capitalism, in post Communist transformation. An overview of key statistics on economic convergence and market failure are presented. The paper then analyses the causes of malaise through the lens of institutionalist and radical perspectives. In doing so key data is assembled and presented from documents of the international financial institutions and other agencies monitoring crime and corruption. The paper concludes that rather than encourage convergence and tame dysfunctionality, neoliberalism and its offspring of labour market reform has created the conditions for continuing economic divergence and for wild capitalism to survive and thrive.
Introduction
When we examine the experience of post-communist transformation two key aspects of market failure are evident. First, predictions from orthodox economists of early economic convergence with the west have failed to materialise. While growth rates of GDP have often outstripped the old market economies, levels of industrial production have hardly exceeded 1989 levels, and are in some cases still behind. Income inequality between east and west has failed to narrow, and employment growth has been absent. The 2008 financial crash also appears to have had a worse effect on the post-communist economies than their western counterparts. Second, the 'dysfunctional' aspects of the market have become more prominent in both absolute and relative measurement. Dysfunctionality can be characterised by inefficient forms of market regulation, informal and/or illegal work, lack of regard for the rule of law, together with continuing problems of crime, corruption and state capture models of governance. In this article it is suggested that problems of both the lack of convergence and persistence of dysfunction are a consequence of a particular model of labour exploitation based on labour cost reduction as a source of competitive advantage. Neoliberal restructuring has acted to engender this model and labour market 'reforms' designed to unblock dysfunctionality, rather than solve the problem, have acted to exacerbate it. Poor business ethics and weak standards of corporate governance are a consequence of the combination of market liberalisation, dependence on labour exploitation for comparative advantage, and the abandonment of one party authority over control of industrial production. This chemistry of events allowed rapacious rent-seeking by individuals well placed to benefit from the newly de-regulated regime (Filatov, 1994) . In turn, this has created political and economic space for the informal economy to grow and mafia crime and corruption to flourish. This article examines these two key dimensions of failure in post-communist economies; namely the failure of these economies to converge with western market economies and persistent dysfunction in their economic systems, and the presence of high levels of corruption in particular. A brief statistical overview of related measures of convergence and 'dysfunctionality' are given. The market failure, institutionalist and radical perspectives are 3 presented and critically assessed. The article concludes with an alternative synthesis which draws on notions of uneven and combined development and the embeddedness of dysfunctional practices.
The False Mantra of Economic Convergence?
We need first to consider the orthodox economic 'model' of transformation. This dominant economic model, revealed in neoliberal prescriptions applied by Governments, international financial institutions (IFIs) and their advisors, was that of the establishment of comparative advantage through trade integration, capital shift and equalisation of marginal profit rates.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson international free trade model would anticipate the development of comparative advantage in national production regimes, initially re-enforced by capital transfers and foreign direct investment in the cheaper labour economies of the east, complemented by labour migration in the opposite direction (Dunford and Smith, 2004) . The technology gap between east and west would be bridged by the process of investment and this would in turn lead to a closure of the productivity gap. This would then act to equalise marginal profit rates as labour costs and rates of return on capital investment converged.
Shock therapy was designed to act as an enabling vehicle of this process, by clearing the post-communist market of labour 'rigidities', and allowing investment opportunities in both privatised formerly state owned industries and greenfield industry. The opening of markets, aided in some states by accession to the EU, would also act as a spur for convergence. After twenty years and more of post-communist transformation we find while there is clear evidence of trade integration, the evidence on convergence is less strong. On trade integration the World Bank finds:
Trade integration in the transition (formerly centrally planned) ECA countriesmeasured by the sum of merchandise exports and imports as a share of GDP in purchasing power parity-rose from 20 percent in 1994 to around 50 percent in 2008, about 10-15 percentage points higher than in developing East Asia and Latin America. Turkey saw an increase from 10 percent to 30 percent over the same period.
The averages mask substantial variation across subregions-the ratio ranged from a median value of around 35 percent in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Moldova, where exports are generally intensive in natural resources and unskilled labor, to 4 nearly 85 percent in the new member states of the European Union and Croatia, where exports are intensive in capital and skilled labor (World Bank, 2010) .
Indeed, the process of integration into the world economy was associated and led by export led development in transformation countries, alongside credit expansion designed to help build domestic capital formation and consumer demand (EBRD, 2010: v Bank, 2002 Bank, , 2010 . Three key areas are identified by the IFIs for measurement where lack of convergence can be observed. These are indices of total production; income per capita; and totals of employment. On total production, Poland was the first country to recover to 1989 levels of production, which it achieved in 1995, followed by Slovenia (1998), and Hungary (2000) . But for many other transformation states production levels have still not reached their 1989 levels. Serbia and Ukraine, for example, are still at about 70 per cent of 1989 levels of production, while Latvia languished with production levels in 2010 only 56 per cent of 1989 levels ii .
The difficult return to 1989 production levels also has a geo-economic dimension. Those states geographically closest to the European Union generally have returned to post-1989 production levels more readily, and have higher income per capita. Those former Communist states who have become full members of the EU have also fared better than later members, or non-members. As the World Bank reports:
At the beginning of the new millennium, a profound divide lies between Central and Southeastern Europe (SEE) and the Baltics (CSB) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the CSB, officially measured gross domestic product 5 (GDP) bounced back from a transition recession, recovered to its 1990 level by 1998, and exceeded that level by 6 percent in 2000. However, in the CIS GDP in 2000 stood at only 63 percent of its 1990 level. While GDP in Poland, the most populous country in the CSB, increased by more than 40 percent between 1990 and 1999, it shrank by 40 percent during the same period in the Russian Federation, the most populous country in the CIS (World Bank, 2002) .
Data on income levels show a similar pattern of overall tardiness in growth intensified by east-west geographical disparity. Both Slovenia and the Czech Republic, for example, record income levels per capita closest to the EU 15 median at approximately 75 per cent in 2008 (measured in purchasing power parity -PPP). However, most CIS states are between 5 and 10 per cent of the EU 15 median, while the majority of EU Accession States are at about 50 per cent (World Bank 2010, p 26) . There is evidence of convergence of incomes since 1998, but this is often from a very low starting point measured in purchasing power parity (PPP).
Nominal wage levels remain much smaller than in the west. The convergence that has taken place is largely explained by a growth of real wages from 2003 to the financial crash of 2008.
This growth followed a major fall in real wage growth in the immediate period after 1989, and in some countries, such as Bulgaria and Lithuania the recent growth is still not enough to bring real wages back to the levels of 1989 (Onaran, 2010) .
In terms of employment the phenomena of 'jobless growth' is apparent across the region, at a scale larger than evident in the countries of the EU 15 (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006) . Employment levels are depressed and decreasing in total while unemployment levels increase. Furthermore the evidence would suggest that the 2008 financial crisis has had generally more severe effects in the post-communist states than in most of western Europe.
Hungary, Latvia and Romania have resorted to IMF credit, but the associated level of austerity introduced as part of the package is more intense than west European comparisons, including that of the 'peripheral' states of Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain (Onaran, 2010) . In Latvia, for example, public sector wages have been cut by 35 per cent and pensions by 10 per cent, while VAT has been increased from 18 to 21 per cent. In other countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania, deep cuts of 20 per cent have also been enforced as part of austerity measures (Gligorov et al., 2009) . But although the net result of the persistence of the above features has been a miserable one for the mass of working people, it has been a lucrative one for the elite. Inequality has increased markedly. Pre-transition Gini co-efficients were around The downgrading of the protective labour codes has also enabled the process of informalisation whereby regulations on dismissals and redundancies as well as pension provision have been loosened in an effort to clear labour market 'rigidities'. Indeed, such downgrading of labour protection has been a major focus of IFI conditionality in the granting of loans and grants (Forteza and Rama, 2001; Upchurch, 2009 There is also a preponderance of weak and under-developed agencies within 'civil society' (Howard 2003) , which might otherwise have been able to keep corporate and individual interests in check. This 'weak' civil society in most cases sits side-by-side with a strong state, the hands of the ruling coalitions at the local levels'. In such a scenario the door is opened for 'state capture' models of political process, whereby competing elites jostle for privilege and position while having a collective vested interest in preserving oligarchical and clientelist systems of governance. In these 'capture economies' oligarchs and captor firms do not pressure states to regulate through institutions, rather they seek to enhance their property rights by directly purchasing advantages from the state (Hellman et al., 2000) . Indeed, So how are the problems of lack of convergence and continuing and worsening dysfunction to be explained? We look first at orthodox explanations and then at heterodox.
Market failure explanations for persistent divergence and corruption
Orthodox economic explanations for the lack of convergence focus on a number of explanations. These explanations include claims inter alia that in terms of production statistics, the pre-transformation states had falsely calculated totals (Åslund, 2001 ) and that the 'fall' in production post transformation is exaggerated as a result. However, even given the likelihood of such false calculation the falls in output have been excessive, and over a twenty year period consistency in statistical production has been achieved. Other commentators point to the impact of external trade shocks, a mismatch in aggregate demand and supply of goods and services, or simply policy mistakes as the cause of falls in output (see Turley and Luke, 2011, pp. 242-243 , for a review of these arguments). Some also point to a 'theory of disorganisation' as an explanatory factor whereby existing supply chains under the command economy have been broken by the turn to the market, and new supply chains
have not yet developed in response (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999 ). More salient are the possible hypotheses presented by Lucas (1990) explanations, which all may have some validity in the short term, begin to appear unsatisfactory given the extended period of more than twenty years of transition, in which output levels, while sometimes growing have struggled in both relative and absolute terms.
Neither do they necessarily explain lack of convergence in other indicators, such as labour market participation, or give reasons to explain the relative increase in informal working.
The persistence of wild and crony capitalism is explained in orthodox accounts primarily by agency factors linked to blockages to reforms. Such 'blockage', it is suggested, is engendered by corrupt insiders with vested interests (Lane Bruner, 2002; Harper, 2006; Gustafson, 1999; Peev, 2002) . Other commentators offer cultural/historical explanations for the persistence of bribery and corruption. In particular, the (relative) lack of corruption in western countries is explained by religious tradition, whereby countries which have a background of British colonial rule, with protestant origins and a long exposure to 'democracy' are less likely to experience corruption than poorer, non-English speaking, non-Protestant countries (see, for example La Porta et al, 1999; Treisman, 2000) . One culturalist argument put forward to explain continuing corruption comes from the 'Slavic' tradition depicted in Serbia. That is to say that within Serbian popular tradition it is considered perfectly acceptable to bribe someone in order to 'oil' the process of business. Commercial bribery becomes acceptable when local or national public authorities remain impassive to the problem, or engage in corruption on a widespread basis themselves. Thus, 'Popular tradition tacitly approves and has great understanding for an individual who by bribery expedites or receives certain decisions or settlement, because it knows that the state administration or authorities, or state employees who are representatives of the authorities, can always find an excuse for not issuing a ruling' (Antonić et al., undated: 26) .
However, it would be wrong, as in the above examples, to explain the high incidence of representation, in contrast to many other agents within civil society, directly challenges existing power relationships between capital and labour, and is likely to be more disruptive of 'consensus' than may otherwise be the case with many civil society organisations. Discussion articles commissioned by the World Bank do in fact begin to address this problem (Mosse 2004) , by differentiating participation as a vehicle for empowerment by which poorer groups can have the power to do things, against those for which empowerment allows them to have power over things or people within the context of a struggle for resources (Nelson and Wright, 1994) . This conundrum between power over and power to do poses problems for policy which relies on the development of social capital for its theoretical and practical base.
Policy solutions will remain elusive so long as social capital is considered a class 'neutral' transformative vehicle (Das, 2006) . Such tensions within a framework of social capital posed by the role of trade unions are, however, apparent in the discourse of the IFIs in offering explanations of dysfunction. Most often the 'problem' is presented as one of the ambiguity and complexity of 'political economy' rather than one of class differentiated interests (World Bank, 2008, p. i) . In respect of this conundrum of 'complexity' and 'ambiguity', Upchurch and Weltman (2008) have argued through the method of textual analysis that the IFI approach is little more than a form of 'utopian liberalism....(whereby) a false harmony of interests is presumed between capital and labour that in reality cannot be bridged '. Given this obfuscation of reality it may not be so surprising that the World Bank and other agencies continue to struggle to explain dysfunction by simply addressing the problem through the lens of further market tampering. To take the analysis further we may need to view market 'dysfunction' not as a temporary deflection from normative market efficiency but rather as a permanent or embedded feature of transformation. Alternative, and critical explanations are necessary which avoid the utopianism of liberal economic normative thought.
A radical perspective
The dominance of neoliberal practice has also been explained by the trajectory of economic restructuring within the region. Indeed, a focus on exploitative relationships can be discerned in both regulationist and critical Marxist interpretations of transformation. In this scenario the entry of the post-communist economies into the world market was predicated on a state strategy of encouraging and promoting production regimes based on labour rather than capital intensity (Bohle, 2006; Bohle and Greskovits, 2007) . For some, this was an elite-driven process whereby state restructuring in post-communist states was linked to the interests of western-based transnational capital (van der Pijl, 1993; Shields, 2008) . Gowan (1995) similarly argued that West European capital sought eastward expansion precisely to exploit cheaper labour and expand markets. As such extensive labour exploitation, achieved through poor working conditions and relatively low pay, was necessary both for capital accumulation in the east and profit maximisation of western-based capital expanding to the east. Neoliberal marketisation may then have fulfilled the objectives of western capital by opening up new production opportunities in geographical spaces unfettered by restraints on profit maximisation. Indeed, models of exploitation might explain the denial of the 'factor-price equalisation' model to operate and go some way to explaining non-convergence.
Neoliberalism, in such accounts, is thus subject to its own contradictory forces and produces a paradox of low consumption demand in the east which holds back pressure for higher rates of wage growth, productivity increase and factor equalisation. Data collected by Onaran (2008) suggests that wage growth has generally not kept pace with productivity growth
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(GDP/employee) in the region, especially in manufacturing. Unit labour costs would therefore have fallen in relative terms, confirming the exploitation 'model'. However, while 'under-consumption' may be a consequence of neoliberal prescription it is not necessarily the cause of crises, which lay more acutely in crises of profitability and debt (Kliman, 2011) .
But how might the persistence of market dysfunction be explained in these models of exploitation? David Harvey (2003, pp. 145-147) 
Towards a synthesis?
To summarise the analysis so far, we have seen that levels of production, income and employment still lag behind twenty plus years after 1989. There is unevenness in the record, with those states geographically closer to the west and the EU faring better than those further away. Convergence has not occurred, and there is a persistence of features of wild capitalism such as cronyism, corruption, crime, and informal and illegal working. Neoliberal prescriptions, aided and abetted by the financial institutions, tells us insiders who profit from such malfeasance are barriers to reform, and therefore new entrants must be encouraged by more of the same reforms to break the mould. Wild capitalism, and the resultant lack of convergence, is then presented as a temporary dysfunction on way to the nirvana of the invisible hand. A harmony of interests is assumed whereby social capital and institution building is presented as a necessary pre-condition to barrier erosion. It is suggested in this article that such a harmony of interests is an illusion, founded on obscuration of class division and interests and manifested as a form of utopian liberalism. We can, however, offer explanations for the lack of convergence and the continued lag of growth and production.
This may be rooted in a model of exploitation whereby the driving force of development is grounded in the search for low unit labour costs and profit maximisation, rather than factorprice equalisation and convergence. As such, the neoliberal model is hoist on a petard of its own contradictions. What is more difficult to explain is the continuation of wild capitalism as a distinct and common feature across transformation states. In this respect, rather than adopt a purely path dependent, institutionalist approach to the analysis it is more appropriate to adopt an approach that marries the dialectic of both path dependency and path shaping in helping out understanding (see, for example, Nielsen et al., 1995) .
As an aid to developing such an approach we might see that the process of transformation, and its outcomes, is governed by both uneven and combined development of the social forces of production. Such theories of uneven and combined development have a long history, and were applied most trenchantly to analyses of the form and content of the 1917 Russian Revolution, most notably in Trotsky's History of the Russian Revolution (1977) and more recently by Novack (1980) . Uneven and combined development has become a sub-study in disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, archaeology, anthropology and international relations theory with research centres devoted to its study. An ongoing debate has developed about whether or not the theoretical framework can be applied transhistorically (Rosenberg, 2006) or can be only limited to study of capitalist regimes of production (Ashman, 2009) .
Given the globalising period of capital expansion which embraced the 1989 revolutions, such theories are trenchant as the post-communist economies enter the world market order on an 'unfettered' basis (see Dale (ed) 2011, for a more detailed exposition of this theoretical position). As these economies entered the world market they were subsumed into a generalising tendency to equalise the rate of profit under the weight of the law of value, in 18 that product competition became governed by the necessity to produce with the minimum amount of labour time (see also Hardy 2009). However, as Barker (2006) suggests it is this very process of creating evenness in the rate of profit that exposes un-evenness in the productive capacity of enterprises within transformation states.
The interaction of capitals, through the circuit of production and circulation, involves unevenly advantaged capitals which differentially invest in new means of production, thus tending to cheapen commodities at the point of sale. They act in this way because of competition between them, and because, in any case, technical change does not occur evenly. (Barker 2006, p. 81) .
Where unevenness exists it is exposed in the final price of goods and services with the consequence of enterprise collapse and industrial restructuring. Evenness, in the case of neoliberal prescriptive methods under transformation, may only be achieved on an exploitative labour-price model and (combined) 'western' forms of work organisation and technological input. In such a model the extraction of value is either achieved through extensive forms of exploitation (lower pay, longer working hours etc.) or intensive exploitation (technological inputs). However, the reliance on an exploitative model further highlights unevenness, not only between east and west, but also within and between postcommunist states themselves. Unevenness is thus a combination of both backwardness in technique, productivity and innovation as well as forwardness by which the backward nations skip whole phases of development by adopting the most advanced techniques of production and industrial organisation. Unevenness between the post-communist states as described here therefore reflects different combinations of (relative) backwardness and processes of 'skipping over' to more advanced stages within states own unique place in the world economy. The combined aspect of development follows on from the unevenness, in that the most modern and technologically efficient modes of production sit side-by-side with 'preexisting modes' of organisation (Burawoy, 1985, p. 99) . As such, work organisation expressed as extensive exploitation of cheap labour and low cost may be found alongside 'cathedrals in the desert' where advanced technical processes are applied to extract value through intensive means (Hardy 2009 ).
As Davidson (2010) suggests uneven and combined development affects not just the economy but society in general, its norms of behaviour, and patterns of authority and control.
So there emerges a direct linkage between the material base of the production process and the 19 continuation and adaptation of behavioural practice. For our purpose we can thus discern in post-communist states a continuation of many of the ways and means of the 'old order' combined with the new. This is especially important when we consider two important aspects of the organisation of working life, that of informal and illegal working. Unevenness produced by the predatory nature of neoliberalism provides explanation for the persistence not only of lagged production growth but also increasing informalisation of the economy (Woolfson, 2007) . In terms of informal working, Williams and Round (2007) provide sound evidence that informal working had always been a feature of the economy under the command economy and is now carried over in post transformation as custom and practice.
Informal working may under the old order have supplemented formal employment; have been utilised as 'off the books' payment in 'brown envelope' bonuses; or simply paid as favours akin to forms of mutual aid between individuals and households.
We must also consider, as Clarke (2002) reminds us, under the command economy a large range of services (e.g. painting and decorating, TV and radio repair, care of elderly etc.) were not provided by state-owned enterprise. 'Informal' working, when depicted by such tasks, was integral to the system. Informal working, as Round (2007, p. 2326 ) suggest may thus be considered as a 'core means of livelihood for a significant proportion of households' that has since been carried over into the new order. Rather than being discouraged by a state's entry into the world economy, the legacies of past practices of informal working are encouraged to expand. Round et al (2008) , in their study of employment practices for Ukrainian graduates, for example, find that informal methods of recruitment and selection predominate alongside the growth of informal working. Most notably bribery and corruption is de rigeur within this sub-set of employment practices.
Furthermore, while the Ukrainian Government have taken steps to counter bribery and corruption, it has little effect other than driving up the price of bribes in reflection of the higher risks (see Jain, 2001) . A related feature is that under Communism the black market economy created and sustained a market for shortfall products within the system. The black economy was, by definition 'off the books' and more often than not involved in trading goods and services illegally.
As has been argued in this article there has emerged a distinct interplay between informal working and illegal working, between the grey economy of informal working and the black economy of illegal working. The operators of the black market under transformation conditions were well placed to take the economic and political opportunity to expand their 20 trading relationships with the clientelist groups associated with the new ruling elites. The old nomenklatura and the penumbra mafia operators of the black market thus have a vested interest in blocking any 'reform' of the economy constructed in regulatory form. The two social forces combined to preserve their position within the new market-based economy.
Their complicity with, and sometimes integration into the state machinery regularises irregularity, and ensures the continuation of old habits alongside attempts to introduce new regulatory regimes based on the western ideal. In conclusion, we can begin to appreciate that rather than being a temporary dysfunction, 'wild' capitalism emerges as the normal modus operandi of post-communist transformation. Orthodox prescriptions merely exacerbate the problems of wild capitalism by opening further the doors of irregular market behaviour and blocking the possibility of economic convergence. Most importantly, in terms of structure, the process of transformation remains inextricably linked to a particular model of labour exploitation that feeds more general economic asymmetries between east and west.
Conclusion
What has been argued in this article is that the lack of economic convergence and persistence of dysfunctionality in post Communist transformation is a direct product of the dominant prescribed political economy. Rather than encourage convergence and tame dysfunctionality, neoliberalism and its offspring of labour market reform has created the conditions for continuing economic divergence and for wild capitalism to survive and thrive. Debt dependence and labour exploitation has not proved a sustainable option for post Communist economies and consequently the financial crash of 2008 has further exacerbated and exposed the underlying social and economic problems.
